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ABSTRACT 
Using microdata for 35 countries over the period 1985-1994-2002 we find that 
labor market institutions traditionally associated to more compressed wage structures are 
associated to a higher family gap. Our results indicate that these policies reduce the price 
effect of having children but aggravate the human capital loss due to motherhood. We 
also find evidence that policies that help women continue in the same job after childbirth 
decrease the family gap. Of all the countries we study, mothers in Southern Europe suffer 
the biggest family gap and our analysis indicates that this is due to the bad combination of 
labor market policies in these countries. Our results are robust to specification changes 
and indicate that the main reason mothers lag behind other women in terms of earnings is 
the loss of accumulated job market experience caused by career breaks around childbirth. 
(JEL, J31, J60)   
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1. Introduction and Literature Review 
In the last thirty years the Spanish fertility rate has decreased fifty percent 
and is today one of the lowest worldwide. The Spanish population froze between 
1989 and 1993 and decreased in absolute numbers in 1991 (I.N.E. 2006). At the 
same time, a growing percentage of young and middle age Spanish women joined 
the labor market, in an astonishing increase of the female participation rate from 
28.8% in 1975 to 45.7% in 2005 (I.N.E. 2006). The case of Spain clearly suggests 
that the functioning of labor markets is an important determinant of the cost of 
having children and of fertility decisions. It has been argued for example that high 
unemployment and unstable contracts, common in Southern Europe, raise the cost 
of having children and depress fertility, particularly among younger women 
(Adserà 2002). More generally, the different institutional framework of labor 
markets across countries can be an important determinant of the differences in the 
labor cost of having children internationally and there is evidence that the wage 
penalty associated to motherhood varies quite substantially across countries. For 
example, among the thirty five countries we analyze in this study the mean and 
the standard deviation of the estimated family gap in earnings – the difference in 
earnings between mothers and other women – is .21 and .18 log points 
respectively.  
In this paper we investigate the role of labor market institutions to explain 
the differences in the earnings gap between mothers and non-mothers 
internationally.  
Several studies have looked at the family gap internationally (Davies & 
Pierre 2005, Todd 2001, Harkness & Waldfogel 1999, Sigle-Rushton & 
Page 2 of 52
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 3 
Waldfogel 2004). These studies find that the family gap varies considerable across 
countries, but none has looked in detail at the role of labor market institutions in 
explaining these differences. Gornick et al. (1997) compares fourteen OECD 
countries, as of the middle-to-late 1980s, with respect to their provision of policies 
that support mothers' employment, but that study does not draw a link between 
these institutions and the family gap. Our paper is the first attempt to study 
empirically the relationship between the family gap and the regulation of labor 
across a large sample of countries. We calculate the family gap in thirty five 
different countries and we test the relationship between these family gaps and the 
different regulation of labor in each country during the period 1985-1994-2002. 
The effect of labor market institutions on the family gap is ambiguous. 
Reasons for the difference in earnings between mothers and non-mothers include 
a price effect, a human capital effect and a heterogeneity effect (Waldfogel 
1998b). According to the price effect, one reason mothers lag behind other women 
in terms of earnings is that firms pay women with children a lower wage 
compared to other women, even after controlling for individual characteristics. 
This price effect could reflect the lower effort exerted by mothers in their jobs or 
instead could be due to employers‟ discrimination against mothers. According to 
the human capital effect of motherhood another reason there is a gap between the 
earnings of mothers and non-mothers is that women with children accumulate less 
human capital (job market experience) because they interrupt their careers to take 
care of children (Erosa et al. 2002). 
Labor market institutions such as the minimum wage and collective 
bargaining coverage can attenuate the price effect of motherhood by setting a 
floor on wages received by mothers. In the case of the human capital effect, the 
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impact of labor market institutions on the family gap is more ambiguous.
3
 
4
 Labor 
market institutions such as parental leave and job protection regulations can 
reduce the family gap by lowering the frequency of job transitions around 
childbirth. However, too generous parental leave can lead to long periods out of 
employment and a large loss of experience (Waldfogel 1998), and too strict firing 
restrictions or too high wage floors can lead to unemployment (Nickell 1997, 
Siebert 1997), which would increase the duration of job interruptions. We find 
that tenure enhancing institutions, such as parental leave, job protection 
regulations and restrictions to the use of temporary contracts, are associated to a 
lower family gap. We also find that wage compressing institutions, such as 
                                                         
 
 
 
3
 Lundberg & Rose (2000) find that job interruptions due to motherhood cause the time 
devoted to work by the husband to increase, partially offsetting the negative effect on the mother‟s 
earnings. 
4
 A third explanation for the family gap results from an heterogeneity bias, since it is 
possible that being a mother is correlated with other variables, unobservable, that affect the 
earnings potential of a particular woman. In this case, the estimated family gap would simply 
reflect the effect of these unobservable variables on the earnings potential of mothers but not 
necessarily the fact that having children depresses wages in itself. In this paper we use cross-
sectional data and hence we are not able to quantify the extent of heterogeneity bias in our sample. 
However, since our analysis consists of a cross country comparison, all we need is that the 
correlation between unobservable variables and motherhood, as well as the distribution of the 
former in the population, is similar across countries. 
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unemployment benefits and trade union coverage, are instead associated to a 
larger family gap. Furthermore, our results indicate that this type of policies 
reduce the price effect of motherhood but are associated to a larger human capital 
loss.  
Our paper relates also to the literature that has studied the link between 
labor market institutions and the gender gap. We use the same data set and 
methodology to estimate the family and the gender gaps, which allows us to 
compare the effect of the same group of labor market institutions on each of these 
gaps. In a study of the gender gap in twenty two countries, Blau and Kahn (2003) 
use the same dataset as ours and find that labor market institutions that compress 
the wage structure overall also tend to reduce the wage gap between men and 
women. Shannon (1996) finds that a more generous minimum wage reduces the 
earnings gap between men and women in Canada. Other studies have concluded 
that a reduction of the family gap would cause the gender gap to fall as well 
(Waldfogel 1998, Waldfogel 1998b, Millimet 2000) since a large percentage of 
women are also mothers (60% in our sample).  
We argue that labor market institutions can have very different effects on 
the earnings differential between men and women on the one hand and women 
with children and non-mothers on the other. One key difference between mothers 
and non-mothers is that mothers‟ labor turnover is much higher than that of non-
mothers (Anderson et al. 2003, Data & Smith 2002, Phipps et al. 2001, Klerman 
& Leibowitz 1994). The literature has also found a close link between past 
decisions about labor market participation and women‟s current wage level 
(Eckstein & Wolpin 1989, Altû & Miller 1998) with a particularly strong effect in 
the case of job interruptions due to motherhood (Gronau 1988, Korenman & 
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Neumark 1992). Furthermore, these effects tend to persist in time because 
turnover probabilities depend negatively on tenure and experience (Topel & Ward 
1992). All this literature suggests that tenure enhancing policies will reduce the 
family gap to a larger extent than the gender gap and that wage compressing 
policies can have opposing effects on the two gaps if they result in high 
unemployment which hurts high turnover workers such as mothers the most.  
Our detailed analysis of the link between labor market institutions and the 
gender and family gaps confirms these hypotheses. We find that wage 
compressing institutions have a markedly different impact on the family gap and 
on the gender gap. In particular, we find that while the gender gap decreases with 
the intensity of wage compressing institutions, these institutions are associated to 
a bigger family gap, with a particularly strong effect for collective bargaining 
coverage.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data we use 
in this paper. Section 3 describes the analytical framework. Section 4 shows the 
results. In section 5 we test the robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. The Data 
In this study we use two types of data: microdata to estimate the gender and 
family earnings gap, and data on the intensity of various labor market institutions 
across countries. The data on labor market institutions is explained in detail in the 
next section. In relation to the data that we use to estimate the gender and family 
gaps, we use microdata for thirty five countries from the 1988, 1994 and 2002 
annual files of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is a continuing annual program of 
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cross-national collaboration on surveys covering topics in different areas. Each 
year, the ISSP administers a common set of basic demographic information 
questions, such as age, education, gender, income, employment status, marital 
status, etc. This common set of questions is complemented every year by 
additional questions on a different topic of social interest. In the years 1988, 1994 
and 2002, the ISSP conducted the „Family and Changing Gender Roles‟ studies, 
which in addition to the common set of questions, asked respondents questions 
related to motherhood, childbearing and job market interruptions around 
childbirth.  
The advantage of the ISSP data is the large number of countries for which 
there is information: thirty five in our sample. Its disadvantage is the small size of 
some country-year samples, although the ISSP questions are asked of a 
probability-based nation-wide sample of adults. In section 4 we describe the 
methodology that we use in this study, which we think helps to overcome the 
potential problems of the small sample sizes. 
Table 1 shows the list of countries, the years each country appears in the 
data and the earnings concept being asked in the questionnaire. The third column 
also includes our own labeling of each country into six groups. Throughout the 
paper we present results for each of these groups of countries. As can be seen in 
the table, in the ISSP respondents report earnings differently depending on the 
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country. While in some countries respondents report earnings before taxes in 
others they report earnings after taxes. In our initial models we included a dummy 
variable indicating whether the earnings concept was gross or net of taxes. This 
dummy variable was never significant for the estimation of the family or the 
gender gap.
5
 Also, for some countries, the earnings are top coded. When this was 
the case, we followed two alternatives: to either drop these observations from the 
analysis, or to assign to each the lower bound of the income interval. In each case 
we obtained practically identical results and we present here the results with these 
observations dropped. 
The ISSP data does not give information on the number of weeks worked. 
However, respondents report the number of hours worked per week, which we 
used to fit earnings regressions conditional on part-time or full-time employment, 
where part-time employment is defined as working less than 35 hours per week. 
In relation to the human capital variables, we were able to construct years of 
education for each individual in each country. With respect to labor market 
experience, we don‟t have information about years of experience or job tenure. 
We constructed potential experience combining the information on years of 
education and age of the individual. Although years of experience and/or job 
                                                         
 
 
 
5
 Blau and Kahn (2003) report similar results in their study that also uses the ISSP data for 
years 1985-94, which suffers from similar variation in the way the earnings concept is reported.  
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tenure are both important determinants of the earnings of mothers and non-
mothers, our focus here is on quantifying the earnings gap between mothers and 
other women, and on relating that gap to various labor market institutions. A 
different question of course, is to what extent the existing gap is due to a price 
effect or to a human capital effect, a question that we do not attempt to answer 
here.    
With respect to the labor market institutions, in this study we look at two 
groups of institutions and construct time-varying measures of each one for as 
many countries as possible. Table 2 shows for each country, whether there is 
information available on each labor market institution and whether the variable is 
time-varying. 
First, we look at institutions that potentially help mothers continue with the 
same job after a child is born. In this group, we construct measures of the 
following three policies: parental leave, impediments to the firing of workers and 
restrictions to the use of temporary contracts by firms. Information about these 
policies comes from the O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2001) in the case of 
parental leave and the O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004) in the case of job 
protection regulations. The Data Appendix shows detailed information of each 
one of these policies for each country in our sample.  
We use two measures of parental leave policies, the maximum duration of 
parental leave (in weeks) and the earnings replacement rate while on leave. For 
the protection of jobs, we use an index of the overall strictness of protection of 
regular contracts and an index of the restrictions on the use of temporary 
contracts. The first index combines information on various aspects of the 
protection of workers under regular contracts against dismissal (indefinite 
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contracts), such as the period of advance notice, administrative obstacles to the 
dismissal of workers, the level of severance payments and cases considered unfair 
dismissal (usually subject to higher severance payments). The index on the 
restrictions to the use of temporary contracts or fixed-term contracts – usually 
subject to low or no protection against termination – measures to what extent and 
in which cases temporary contracts are valid according to the law.
6
 In the case of 
job protection measures, the information is time varying, with data given for the 
eighties, nineties and two thousands, and we assign the value for the eighties to 
observations in the ISSP dataset for 1988, the value for the nineties to 
observations for 1994 and the value for two thousands to observations for 2002. 
Our approach here implies that we measure, or use previously computed 
measures of, formal legal rules. One concern is that the quality of enforcement of 
the same rule might vary across countries, and therefore our indices may provide 
little information of what really happens in the labor market. Previous studies that 
make use of similar indices have found that formal rules do matter (see, Botero et 
al. (2004) for a discussion of this problem). Also, to test the robustness of our 
                                                         
 
 
 
6
 The O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004) provides information on other aspects of the 
regulation of temporary contracts such as the maximum number of contracts that can be signed 
consecutively by the same firm and workers. The effect of these on job transitions is less clear than 
that of the index we use here and we found these other aspects to be non-significant when we 
included them in our models.  
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results, we use two different measures or indices for the same set of rules, one that 
comes from the O.E.C.D. and the other from self-computed measures in Botero et 
al. (2004). In both cases, the indices are constructed to reflect not only the 
statutory language but more importantly, the actual economic costs of taking an 
action in the labor market (e.g., firing an employee). Finally, and in order to 
enhance the comparability across countries, we perform the empirical analysis 
using either source of indices of institutions (O.E.C.D. or Botero et al.) rather than 
combining both sources, since each one provides indices that have been made 
comparable across the universe of countries that we analyze in this paper. 
Theoretically, the impact of parental leave on the family gap is ambiguous 
(Waldfogel, 1998). On the one hand, parental policies help mothers continue with 
the same employer/job after childbirth, allowing women with children to 
accumulate job market experience and/or maintain firm specific human capital. 
On the other hand, generous parental leave might induce mothers to stop working 
for longer periods than otherwise, with the corresponding bigger loss of human 
capital.  
The impact of job protection regulations on the family gap is also 
ambiguous. Job protection regulations help mothers continue with the same 
employer after childbirth and since they benefit mothers as long as they continue 
working, they discourage job interruptions. However, job protection regulations, if 
too strict, can lead to unemployment because in the presence of strict firing 
procedures firms become too cautious in the hiring process, and in the presence of 
unemployment, mothers that decide either voluntarily or involuntarily to interrupt 
their career to take care of children might go through a longer job interruption 
than otherwise. Furthermore, in dual labor markets workers with regular contracts 
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benefit from strict firing restrictions while workers under temporary contracts get 
low or no protection against dismissal (Dolado et al, 2005). The restrictions to the 
use of temporary contracts are important here, because in some countries firms 
easily get around the strict regulation of regular contracts by employing a worker 
under a series of consecutive temporary contracts. When there is the possibility of 
using temporary contracts, job tenure is important to gain access to a protected 
job, because the law usually establishes a limited duration and limited number of 
consecutive fixed-term contracts. In this context, it is possible that mothers, with 
lower average tenure than non-mothers, disproportionately concentrate in the 
secondary market, under temporary hence unprotected contracts. 
The second type of labor market institutions we consider is traditionally 
associated with wage compression, that is, with a lower wage gap between various 
groups of workers, such as male and female (Blau and Kahn, 2003). In this group 
we gather information about the following institutions: collective bargaining 
coverage, unemployment benefits, and the minimum wage. We get the 
information on the minimum wage from the O.E.C.D. minimum wage database, 
which reports the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage for 1986 and 
2000. We assign the 1986 value to observations in the ISSP for 1988, and the 
2000 value to the observations for 1994 and 2002. We get the information on 
collective bargaining coverage from the O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004), 
which reports time varying measures of union coverage, for the eighties, the 
nineties and the two thousands. Having time varying information is important here 
because of the changes in many O.E.C.D. countries during the eighties and 
nineties in the direction of lowering the power of unions (Nickell 1997, Siebert 
1997). Information on the level of unemployment benefits was taken from Botero 
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et al., (2004). This is a one-time index of the generosity of unemployment 
benefits, combining information on the replacement rate and the duration of 
unemployment benefits, covering all except one of the thirty five countries in our 
sample.  
The effect of wage compressing institutions on the family gap is also 
ambiguous. The bargaining of wages by unions and the minimum wage may raise 
the relative wage of mothers, provided that women with children are at the bottom 
of the wage distribution. Unemployment benefits may help mothers who stopped 
working and want to return to the labor market to get a higher wage than 
otherwise by allowing them to search longer and find a better match. However, 
these institutions may lead to unemployment causing mothers who decide to 
transition out of employment to suffer a long career break.  
Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients between these various labor 
market institutions. On average countries with stricter protection of regular jobs 
also have more generous parental leave policies, more generous unemployment 
benefits and more powerful unions. Furthermore, stricter protection of regular 
contracts is on average coupled with fewer restrictions on the use of temporary 
contracts by firms, a clear indication of dual markets with respect to job 
protection. As we will se next, this positive correlation between policies is 
important to understand the weak association between the gender and the family 
gaps across countries.   
3. Analytical Framework 
Our empirical analysis consists of two steps. In the first step we estimate the 
family gap in each of 35 countries using the microdata available. In the second 
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step, we estimate reduced form specifications with the family gap as the 
endogenous variable and the various types of labor market institutions as 
explanatory variables. 
With respect to the estimation of the family gap, we follow the methodology 
of Blau and Kahn (2003) which uses the same dataset as ours to analyze the 
gender gap in twenty two countries.
7
 We start by using individual data to estimate 
log earnings equations separately for mothers and non-mothers for each country j 
and year t: 
ijtjtijtjtijt
ijtjtijtjtijtjtjtijt
eKKIDSBX
HRFULLbHRPARTbPARTbbEARN

 3210ln
 (1) 
where i indexes individuals; lnEARN is the natural log of earnings; PART is 
a dummy variable for part-time employment, defined as working less than thirty 
five hours per week; HRPART and HRFULL are interactions of weekly work 
hours with part-time and full-time status; X is a vector of explanatory variables, 
including the usual human capital variables of education, potential experience and 
the square of potential experience; KIDS is a vector of four dummy variables 
included in the earnings equations of mothers only, indicating whether the mother 
has one child, two children, three children or four or more children. 
                                                         
 
 
 
7
 For a more detailed description of this methodology see Blau and Kahn (2003), pp. 115-
123.  
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Unfortunately, the ISSP data does not give information on the number of children 
so we had to estimate this variable combining information on the marital status of 
women and the number of members in the household. Since we identify children 
as long as they live with their mother in the same household, we restricted our 
sample to women younger than 50 years of age. Having estimated (1), we 
compute the family gap in pay in each country and year as follows:  






















MjtMUStMjtMUSt
MUStMjtMUStMjtMUStMjtMjt
NMjtNMUSt
NMUStNMjtNMUStNMjtNMUStNMjtNMjt
jt
KKIDSBX
HRFULLbHRPARTbPARTbb
BX
HRFULLbHRPARTbPARTbb
FAMILYGAP
3210
3210
 (2) 
where NM refers to non-mothers, US refers to the US values and M refers to 
mothers. According to equation (2), FAMILYGAP is an estimate of the gap in 
earnings between mothers and non-mothers in each country and year on the 
assumption that the group of mothers and non-mothers in each country-year 
microdata file have the same average levels of measured characteristics (i.e., 
PART, HRPART, HRFULL, X and KIDS variables) as the group of U.S. mothers 
and non-mothers for that year.
8
 Equation (2) provides a simulated family gap that 
                                                         
 
 
 
8
 In Blau and Kahn (2003), the log of earnings is adjusted for work hours, assuming a 40-
hours work week for all individuals. This removes gender differences in part-time status from the 
calculation of the gender gap. Since here we are interested on the full effects of family status after 
controlling for human capital variables, and provided that one of the sources of the difference in 
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removes the effect of differences in observable characteristics across countries. 
However, labor market institutions can still have an effect on the family gap in at 
least two ways. First, labor market institutions can be important for the different 
returns to the same characteristics for mothers and non-mothers. Second, since 
differences in measured characteristics between mothers and non-mothers remain 
(at the U.S. level) labor market institutions that affect the price of these 
characteristics will play a role in determining the family gap. For example, there is 
plenty of evidence that mothers tend to work fewer hours, or to work part-time 
with higher probability, compared to childless women (see, for example Powell 
(1998) and Howie et al. (2006) for empirical evidence on this issue), which means 
that country differences in the part-time wage penalty will be an important 
determinant of country differences in the family gap.  
In relation to the human capital effect component of the family gap, 
equation (2) allows for institutions to play a role with respect to job market 
experience. The reason is that the X vector includes potential experience (age - 
education years - six), instead of actual experience. We then remove cross country 
differences in potential experience, but not in actual experience. Suppose for 
example that in country j job protection is weak and because of this mothers lose 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
 
 
earnings between mothers and childless women is the higher incidence of part-time status among 
the former, we want to allow for differences in part-time status between women with and without 
children to play a role in determining the family gap. 
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their job frequently and spend a lot of time out of employment when children are 
born. In equation (2) the coefficient of potential experience would be relatively 
low, compared to another country. In general, when the coefficient of potential 
experience is low this could mean either that returns to experience are low or that 
mothers accumulate less experience. This will be true in general for all variables 
potentially correlated with actual experience, such as the number of kids and 
possibly part-time status. With respect to the other variables in X besides potential 
experience (education, part-time status and the number of kids), equation (2) does 
not allow for cross country differences in these variables to play a role. When we 
estimated the family gap allowing for cross country differences in these variables 
to play a role we obtained very similar results, although noisier in general. We 
think that removing international differences in observable characteristics (with 
the exception of actual experience) is an advantage of our methodology because in 
many cases the size of the country-year samples are too small for the distribution 
of X‟s in our data to be representative. Besides, our hypothesis is that the most 
important effect of labor market institutions on human capital variables is their 
impact on the accumulation of job market experience. 
With respect to the reduced form specifications, our sample consists of 54 
country-year observations. Following Blau and Kahn (2003), we start by running 
regressions of the family gap on two measures of male wage dispersion. The 
hypothesis here is that observed male wage inequality is influenced by both 
heterogeneity of productivity characteristics and by the returns to these 
characteristics, being the effect of labor market institutions more important in the 
latter. The two measures of male wage dispersion remove then the effects of 
international differences in measured heterogeneity. First, for each country and 
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year we take the U.S. sample of men for that year and compute a predicted log 
wage for each U.S. male using the coefficients from the wage regression for 
country j and year t. We then compute two measures of wage dispersion: the 
standard deviation of low wages (SD) and the standard deviation of the residuals 
(SDRES). These two measures give us an idea of the degree of wage inequality in 
country j at year t that results from the returns to measured and unmeasured 
characteristics in that country and year:    
jtjtjtjtjt eYYEARbSDRESbSDbFAMILYGAP  210  (3) 
where YEAR is a vector of year dummies and e is the error term. We then 
turn to the reduced form specifications that include the various labor market 
institutions we are interested in. All of our models include year dummies and take 
the following specification: 
jtjtjtjt eYYEARBIINSbFAMILYGAP  0  (4) 
where INS is a vector of explanatory variables indicating the level of the 
various labor market institutions; YEAR is a vector of year dummies and e is the 
error term. 
4.  Results 
Figure 1 offers a first look at the family gap across the thirty five countries 
in our sample. In the figure, we plot the family gap computed using the 
methodology described in Section 3 (FAMILYGAP) against the family gap in the 
raw data, i.e., allowing the set of observable characteristics to vary across 
countries and groups of women. 
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From the figure we can see that there is a positive correlation between the 
two measures of the family gap (the correlation coefficient is .52). The negative 
values for some countries and years disappear when we impose the US level of 
observable characteristics of mothers and non-mothers to the rest of countries, an 
indication that some of these negative values were driven by the different 
characteristics of mothers and non-mothers in those countries rather than the 
returns to those characteristics. As we argued before, we think that this is an 
advantage of our methodology, because it is hard to draw conclusions from the 
different distributions of characteristics across countries, considering the small 
size of some of the samples in the ISSP data set.
9
  
Table 4 shows the average family gap and the two measures of wage 
dispersion for the five groups of countries in our sample. For comparison 
purposes, the table also shows the earnings gap between men and women, the 
gender gap, calculated with identical methodology as the family gap. The table 
indicates that Southern European countries have the largest family gap, even 
though the gender gap is relatively small there. More generally, there is only a 
weak correlation between the family and the gender gaps (the correlation 
                                                         
 
 
 
9
 The three observations with negative numbers in FAMILYGAP correspond to Philippines 
2002, Czech Republic 2002 and Taiwan 2002. When we dropped these observations the results we 
obtained were practically identical, although the fit of the various models was slightly lower. 
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coefficient between the two is only .1017), which suggests that the impact of the 
various labor market policies in each gap might be quite different. 
Table 5 shows the results for the OLS estimation of equation (3). The table 
indicates that higher wage dispersion – higher returns to observable and 
unobservable characteristics – is associated to a higher gender gap but only 
weakly associated to a higher family gap. Residual inequality is not statistically 
significant for both gaps and the standard deviation of wages is statistically 
significant at the 10% level in the case of the gender gap and at the 25% level in 
the case of the family gap. One possible explanation of the results in Table 5 is 
that labor market institutions are more effective at setting a wage floor in the case 
of women in general than in the case of mothers in particular. In dual labor 
markets high-tenure and high-experience workers benefit from social policies 
disproportionately compared to low-tenure and low-experience workers. It has 
been argued that unions fight harder for insiders than outsiders. Also, in some 
countries, Spain being an example, the severance package grows with tenure and 
both the duration and replacement rate of unemployment benefits grows with job 
market experience, giving high-tenure and high-experience workers more power 
to reject wage cuts or even bargain for a wage increase. Another explanation is 
that mothers accumulate less human capital in the presence of labor market 
institutions that compress wages, something that could happen if wage 
compressing institutions lead to unemployment and this causes mothers who 
transition out of the labor market to go through long unemployment spells.   
In Tables 6 to 8 we show the results of estimating various reduced form 
specifications where, instead of the male wage dispersion measures we include 
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proxies for labor market institutions which can affect wage compression overall 
and the family gap in particular.     
Table 6 shows the results for the group of what we call tenure enhancing 
policies: the duration of parental leave (LEAVEWKS), the replacement rate of 
earnings while in parental leave (LVREP), the protection of regular jobs 
(PROTREG) and restrictions to the use of temporary contracts by firms 
(RESTRICTEMP). Across all specifications, each of these policies is associated 
to a lower family gap, i.e., the more generous parental leave, the stricter the 
restrictions to job termination and the stricter the restrictions on the use of 
temporary contracts, the lower the family gap. The significance of parental leave 
duration is greater than that of its replacement rate and when parental leave is 
combined with job protection the fit of the model improves although the impact of 
parental leave falls and becomes insignificant. The effect of job protection and of 
restrictions to the use of temporary contracts is large and highly significant in all 
specifications. For example, using the coefficients in the complete specification, if 
the group of Liberal countries had the same level of job protection of regular jobs 
as the group of Nordic countries, the family gap would fall in the former by 21.9% 
or .07 log points. Also, if Southern European countries had the same duration of 
parental leave as Nordic countries, the family gap would fall in the former by .048 
log points or 13.4%.  
Overall, these results indicate that policies that help mothers continue with 
the same employer/job after childbirth reduce the wage penalty associated to 
motherhood. It should be recalled that the effect of parental leave on the family 
gap is theoretically ambiguous, since generous parental leave might induce 
mothers to stay out of employment for longer periods of time than otherwise, with 
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the corresponding loss of experience. The results in Table 6 confirm those 
obtained by previous studies using British and U.S. data (Waldfogel 1995, 
Waldfogel 1998), and suggest that the net effect of parental leave on human 
capital is a positive one.  
The comparison between the family and the gender gap in Table 6 indicates 
that while parental leave is associated to a lower gender gap, the protection of jobs 
bears no relation with it. These results are intuitive. Whereas women tend to 
benefit disproportionately, compared to men, from parental leave policies, instead, 
job protection regulations and restrictions on the use of temporary contracts are 
important for both men and women.  
We turn now to the analysis of wage compressing institutions. Table 7 
shows the results for collective bargaining coverage. We look at two measures of 
collective bargaining coverage: the percentage of the work force directly or 
indirectly affected by unions‟ agreements (COVERAGE)10 and the ranking of 
countries in relation to trade union coverage (RANK). The reason for including 
this second measure is that the O.E.C.D. reported measure of trade union coverage 
is top coded for some countries. The RANK variable however, is insignificant and 
we dropped it from all except the initial specification. Looking at the impact of 
                                                         
 
 
 
10
 This measure is normally bigger than trade union density, which measures the percentage 
of workers directly affiliated to unions or directly represented by them. 
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trade union coverage on the family gap, the results in the table indicate that more 
powerful unions are associated to a bigger family gap, since the sign of the 
coefficient is positive across all specifications. Furthermore, the magnitude and 
the significance of the coefficient grow as we include other covariates such as 
parental leave policies and job protection regulations. The reason for this is that in 
our sample of countries there exists a positive correlation between trade union 
coverage, parental leave and job protection regulations (see Table 3), and the 
effect of trade union coverage on the family gap is opposed to that of parental 
leave and job protection. In the last specification, not only the size and the 
significance of the trade union coefficient grows, but also that of the parental 
leave and job protection coefficients, compared to Table6. Furthermore, 
combining these four policies in the same specification improves the fit of the 
model, which now explains 37% of the variation in the family gap across time and 
across countries.
11
 With respect to the size of the COVERAGE coefficient, the 
results in the table indicate that if, for example, Southern European countries had 
                                                         
 
 
 
11
 It should be noted that the number of observations changes across the different 
specifications. This is due to the fact that we have information on a specific covariate for some 
countries but not for others. We ran the same regressions limiting our sample to the set of 
countries for which information on all covariates exists, and the results we obtained were 
practically identical to the ones shown in the tables.  
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the same level of trade union coverage as the group of Liberal countries then the 
family gap would fall in the former by .057 log points or 16%.  
With respect to the effect of trade union coverage on the gender gap, Table 7 
shows an important contrast, since trade union coverage is associated to a bigger 
family gap but to a lower gender gap. The negative effect of trade union coverage 
on the gender gap is very strong in magnitude and significance, even when we 
control for parental leave, confirming the results of previous studies (Blau and 
Kahn 2003). This result confirms our previous intuition that unions fight harder 
for the job market prospects of men and women than for mothers in particular. If 
mothers have a weaker attachment to the labor market due to their relatively high 
turnover rates (Anderson et al. 2003, Data & Smith 2002, Phipps et al. 2001, 
Klerman & Leibowitz 1994), and if unions protect insiders more than outsiders 
(Lindbeck & Snower 2001), then unions will have a negligible effect on the 
family gap but not on the gender gap. However, the fact that the sign of the 
coefficient in the case of the family gap is positive and significant suggests that 
unions have an additional negative impact on the family gap. It is possible that 
unions, while raising the relative wage of those at the bottom of the wage 
distribution, women in general, also lead to unemployment which hits particularly 
strong those with a weaker attachment to the labor market, such as mothers. The 
fact that female unemployment rates are positively correlated to both trade union 
coverage (the correlation coefficient is .59 in our sample) and to the size of the 
family gap, supports this hypothesis. The results in Table 7 are also important to 
understand the apparently weak association between the family and the gender 
gaps across countries, something that is not surprising considering that labor 
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market institutions have a different impact on the two gaps and that there is 
variation of labor market institutions across countries.  
Table 8 shows the results for the other two wage compressing institutions: 
unemployment benefits and the minimum wage. As with the case of collective 
bargaining coverage, unemployment benefits are associated to a bigger family 
gap. In all specifications the coefficient is bigger than its standard error and in two 
of the three specifications is significant at the 5% level. The magnitude and 
significance of the coefficient grows as other covariates are included in the model 
(also because of the positive correlation between institutions and their different 
effect on the family gap). As for the magnitude of the coefficient, if Nordic 
countries had the lower level of unemployment benefits of the group of Liberal 
countries, the family gap would decrease in the former by .10 log points or 49.9%. 
Adding the unemployment benefits variable to the model improves its fit, 
explaining now 41% of the variation of the family gap across time and countries. 
As in the case of collective bargaining coverage, an intuitive explanation of this 
result is that while unemployment benefits may raise the relative wage of mothers 
allowing them to find a better match, they may also encourage mothers to stay out 
of the labor market longer than otherwise, with the corresponding loss of job 
market experience. We have to recall here that the correlation coefficient between 
the generosity of unemployment benefits and the female unemployment rate in 
our sample is .14. The results for the minimum wage indicate that this variable is 
not related to the family gap, although we should note that we were able to 
construct this variable for only ten of the thirty five countries in our sample. 
In relation to the effect of unemployment benefits and the minimum wage 
on the gender gap, Table 8 indicates that the minimum wage has a strongly 
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significant and negative impact on the gender gap and that the level of 
unemployment benefits is not significantly related to the gender gap. 
Overall, the results in tables 6-8 indicate that policies that help mothers 
continue with the same employer/job after childbirth reduce the family gap, 
whereas policies aimed at raising the relative wage of mothers increase the family 
gap.  As mentioned before, one possible explanation for this is that wage 
compressing policies lead to rigid labor markets with high unemployment rates, 
which increases the length of spells out of employment by mothers around 
childbirth. Unfortunately, the ISSP data does not give information on the duration 
of spells out of employment around childbirth, so we cannot directly test this 
hypothesis. However, there is some indirect evidence that tends to support it. This 
evidence is shown in Table 9 and in Table 10. Table 9 displays the correlation 
coefficients across countries between the level of trade union coverage, 
unemployment benefits, the probability of a job interruption around childbirth and 
the percentage of women under part-time employment. In the ISSP data, 
approximately forty percent of mothers answered to the following question: “Did 
you stop working right after your child was born and during pre-school period?” 
For these mothers there is also information as to whether they were or not 
working before childbirth. Combining these two questions we calculated the 
probability that a mother interrupted her career because of a child spell 
(JOBINTERRUPT).  
Table 9 shows that in countries with a higher level of trade union coverage 
and more generous unemployment benefits, women face higher unemployment 
rates, mothers tend to interrupt their careers less frequently and are rarely 
employed in part-time jobs. This is clearly consistent with a picture of rigid, 
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„sclerotic‟, labor markets in which mothers who transition out of employment 
either voluntarily or involuntarily because of a child spell may suffer a relatively 
long period of joblessness.
12
 In Table 10 we break the family gap in equation (2) 
in two components. The first component is a proxy for the price effect associated 
to motherhood. We construct this price effect by removing from the family gap 
the impact of variables which we think are correlated with the job market 
experience and the tenure of mothers and non-mothers, i.e., potential experience 
(POTEXP), part-time status (PART), job interruption controls (JOBINTERRUPT) 
and the number of kids (KIDS). The price effect component is then, 
    UStEDMjtEDNMjtMjtNMjtjt educBBbbPRICEFFECT  00  (5) 
where the coefficients are estimated as in equation (1). The price effect is 
then the sum of two terms. The second term measures the difference in the returns 
to education between mothers and non-mothers  EDMjtEDNMjt BB  . Note that in this 
second term, we set the level of education to be the same for mothers and non-
mothers and across countries, at the US level. This is then, a pure price effect due 
to a different price of education for mothers compared to non-mothers. The first 
term is the difference in the constant terms for mothers and non-mothers and is 
                                                         
 
 
 
12
 Del Boca et al (2003) and Adserà (2002) argue that in such labor markets women delay 
their fertility decisions until they have secured an indefinite contract that protects them against the 
possibility of being laid off because of a child spell. 
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supposed to measure the extent the returns to unobserved characteristics are also 
different between mothers and non-mothers. The human capital effect is simply 
the difference between the family gap in equation (2) and the price effect: 
 jtjtjt PRICEFFECTFAMILYGAPHCEFFECT   (6) 
The results shown in Table 10 should be taken with caution. Given that in 
the ISSP data we cannot measure job market tenure, it is possible that variables 
included in the PRICEFFECT component capture to some extent the human 
capital effect due to motherhood, and vice versa. Despite the data limitations we 
face, the results are broadly consistent with our previous intuition. In the case of 
the wage compressing institutions, the coefficients are always bigger than its 
standard errors for both the price and the human capital effects and have a 
negative sign in the case of the price effect but a positive one in the case of the 
human capital effect. In other words, according to the results in the table, wage 
compressing institutions reduce the gap between mothers and non-mothers with 
respect to the returns on a given set of skills, however, these institutions cause 
mothers to lose job market experience relative to non-mothers, which increases 
the family gap. In the case of the tenure enhancing institutions, as expected, all 
these institutions are associated to a lower human capital effect, although only the 
parental leave variable remains significant. With respect to this last variable, the 
table also indicates that parental leave is associated to higher price effect.   
Table 11 decomposes the impact of each one of the labor market institutions 
in determining the family gap in each group of countries. The table shows the log 
points difference between the family gap in one group of countries and the sample 
average due to each of the labor market institutions. The family gap in the first 
column is the fitted values of the family gap in a regression against parental leave, 
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job protection regulation, restrictions on the use of temporary contracts, trade 
union coverage, unemployment benefits and year dummies, subtracting from the 
fitted value the effect of the year dummies. The contrast between the group of 
Liberal and Nordic countries is particularly interesting. The former are 
representative of flexible, unregulated labor markets with a relatively low level of 
almost all labor market institutions, with the exception of restrictions to temporary 
contracts. Instead, the Nordic countries are the typical example of regulated labor 
markets with a relatively high level of almost all the labor market institutions. 
Since the effect of the two groups of labor market policies on the family gap is of 
opposite sign, Liberal countries benefit from the relatively low level of wage 
compressing policies, but get hurt by the relatively low level of tenure enhancing 
policies. Just the opposite story can be said in relation to the group of Nordic 
countries. The group of Southern European countries displays the typical picture 
of dual labor markets, with two differentiated segments, one heavily protected by 
strict firing restrictions, and possibly by unions, and the other subject to 
temporary, easy to terminate, contracts. This particular combination of policies 
seems to be the worst in relation to the family gap, since both the relatively low 
level of tenure enhancing policies (mainly due to the lax regulation of temporary 
contracts) and the relatively high level of wage compressing policies contribute to 
the large gap in Southern European countries, which is 26% higher than the 
sample mean.         
5. Robustness Tests 
In tables 12 to 14 we test the robustness of our results throughout different 
specifications, by including additional controls and changing the way we compute 
the family gap. For comparison purposes, the first column in Table 12 and the first 
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two columns in Table 13 present our earlier results. In Table 12 we show the 
magnitude of the family gap across different specifications of step 1 of our 
methodology (equations (1) and (2)). FAMILYGAP2 is the family gap estimated 
from individual earnings regressions on mothers and non-mothers including two 
additional controls that could be correlated with the family gap and the labor 
market institutions variables: a control for whether the mother stopped working 
around childbirth (JOBINTERRUPT) and a control for public sector employment 
(INPUBLIC). In FAMILYGAP2 the job interruption controls are allowed to vary 
by country, since the proportion of mothers that stop working around childbirth is 
potentially affected by the set of labor market regulations in each country. 
FAMILYGAP2 is then obtained from the following equation: 



























MjtMUStMjtMjt
MjtMUStMjtMUSt
MUStMjtMUStMjtMUStMjtMjt
NMjtNMUStNMjtNMUSt
NMUStNMjtNMUStNMjtNMUStNMjtNMjt
jt
IINPUBLICJPTJOBINTERRU
KKIDSBX
HRFULLbHRPARTbPARTbb
IINPUBLICBX
HRFULLbHRPARTbPARTbb
FAMILYGAP
3210
3210
2
 (7) 
where the coefficients are obtained from individual wage regressions such 
as, 
ijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijt
ijtjtijtjtijtjtjtijt
eIINPUBLICJPTJOBINTERRUKKIDSBX
HRFULLbHRPARTbPARTbbEARN

 3210ln
 (8) 
Finally, in the last column of the table, FAMILYGAP3 is the earnings gap 
between mothers and non-mothers assuming that mothers and non-mothers have 
the same levels of observable characteristics, except for the kids and job 
interruption controls which are mother specific: 
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 According to FAMILYGAP3, given that mothers and non-mothers have the 
same levels of observable characteristics, the main reason for a family gap is that 
the returns to the same skills are different between mothers and non-mothers.  
FAMILYGAP4, in column 4 of Table 12, is computed using in step 1 in the 
methodology the full sample of women: job market participants as well as non-
participants. We discuss the results of this exercise (as well as the regression 
results in column 5 of Table 13) in the section below about selection bias. Finally, 
we add a control for whether the woman cohabits with a partner or husband or is a 
lone mother in column 5 of Table 12 (FAMILYGAP5). We are concerned here 
that an important family status variable not introduced in the previous 
specifications is driving the variation in the family gap across countries. 
The numbers in Table 12 show that, when additional controls are included, 
the difference in the family gap across countries grows, with the gap increasing in 
countries with an already large family gap and decreasing in countries with a 
relatively low family gap. The ranking of countries remains the same, with 
Southern European countries showing the biggest wage penalty for mothers, 
followed by the group of Liberal countries, Continental European countries, and 
Nordic countries. Also, and as one should expect, the magnitude of the family gap 
falls in all groups of countries in column 3, when we remove the difference in 
observable characteristics between mothers and non-mothers. But still in the case 
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of FAMILYGAP3, the ranking of countries is the same as before. Overall, the 
results in table 12 show that the difference in the family gap in pay across 
countries is quite robust to the specification changes in step 1 of our methodology.  
In Table 13 we test the robustness of the results for step 2 across different 
specifications. In columns 2 and 3, we run regressions on the same vector of labor 
market institutions as before but now including as dependent variable 
FAMILYGAP2 and FAMILYGAP3, respectively. In column 4, we regress 
FAMILYGAP against an alternative measure of unemployment benefits 
(SOCIALSEC), trade union power (COLLREL), and job protection regulations 
(EMPLAW). These new measures of labor market institutions come from Botero 
et al., (2004). SOCIALSEC stands for Social Security Laws Index and measures 
social security benefits as the average of: (1) Old age, disability and death 
benefits; (2) Sickness and health benefits; and (3) Unemployment benefits. 
COLLREL stands for Collective Relations Law Index and measures the protection 
of collective relations laws as the average of: (1) Labor union power; and (2) 
Collective disputes. EMPLAW stands for Employment Laws Index, and measures 
the protection of labor and employment laws as the average of: (1) Alternative 
employment contracts; (2) Cost of increasing hours worked; (3) Cost of firing 
workers; and (4) Dismissal procedures. 
Column 6 in Table 13, presents the regression results for the specification 
that controls for marital status. 
The numbers in Table 13 show that the effect of labor market institutions on 
the family gap is very robust to changes in the specification of the dependent and 
independent variables. When additional controls are included (FAMILYGAP2), 
the fit of the model improves and both the significance and the magnitude of the 
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coefficients grow. Under this specification, we are able now to explain 49% of the 
variation of the family gap across time and countries. In the case of 
FAMILYGAP3, not surprisingly, the magnitude and significance of the 
coefficients fall (we are removing differences in observables between mothers and 
non-mothers as a source for the gap) but wage compressing institutions continue 
to be associated to a bigger family gap and tenure enhancing institutions to a 
lower one. In column 4, the new measures of labor market institutions have a 
similar impact on the family gap as the ones they replace, with a particularly 
strong effect for the SOCIALSEC variable. It should be noted, that these new 
measures of institutions are aggregates of measures that we previously 
disaggregated (for example, the EMPLAW measure is an average of job 
protection and restrictions to the use of alternative – possibly temporary – 
contracts), so it is not surprising that the fit of the model and the significance of 
the coefficients fall in column 4 compared to the other columns. 
In relation to the results that control for marital status, the signs of the 
coefficients are the same as in the previous specifications, with unemployment 
insurance and trade union coverage being positively associated to the family gap, 
and the tenure enhancing institutions being negatively associated to the family 
gap. 
Since the family gap in Southern European countries is remarkably bigger 
than anywhere else across all specifications, in Table 14 we test the robustness of 
our previous results to the inclusion of a Southern Effect. It is possible, for 
example, that cultural factors explain the relatively large family gap in Southern 
European countries. If these cultural factors are correlated with the set of labor 
market institutions in these countries, then it is possible that all we are doing is to 
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capture a Southern effect through the coefficients on the labor market institutions 
variables. We ask, then, to what extent our previous results are driven by extreme 
values of the Southern European countries. Table 14 indicates that as more 
variables are included in the specification, both the magnitude and the 
significance of the Southern effect fall. In the last specification, considering all the 
labor market institutions, the Southern effect loses its significance and, with the 
exception of RESTRICTEMP, the magnitude and significance of the labor market 
institutions controls remains remarkably similar to the ones we obtained before. 
The table suggests, then, that the Southern effect is nothing else than the 
combined effect of the set of labor market policies in Southern European 
countries.  
Selection bias 
Throughout the paper, we constructed the family gap and run regressions 
against institutions using only the group of women that report non-zero working 
hours on the labor market. Since women who do not work are excluded, there 
might be a selection bias in our results (Heckman, 1979). The traditional approach 
is to estimate a Heckman selection model that includes a participation equation 
with variables often being marital status and spouses‟ income. The ISSP data does 
not give information on spouse‟s income but for some countries it gives 
information on family income, which can be used as a proxy for the spouse‟s 
income after subtracting the respondent‟s earnings in the year. 
When we run Heckman selection models we don‟t find evidence of 
selection bias. For example, out of the eighteen countries for which we have 
information on family income and marital status in 2002, in only one case (Japan) 
the coefficient on lambda, the selection term, was significant – and negative - at 
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standard levels.
13
 In all other cases, the selection term was not significant. Other 
studies of the family gap in pay have found mixed evidence in relation to selection 
bias (see, for example Waldfogel, 1995 & 1998 for a commentary on this issue). 
One reason of the seemingly weak evidence on selection bias in the case of the 
family gap is that although the participation patterns of men and women are very 
different, those of women with and without children tend to be more similar. We 
don‟t see, however, our results as strong evidence against selection bias. The ISSP 
data is probably not the best data to analyze this type of issues, since, on average 
for each country and year, we are working with sample sizes of less than 300 
observations,  of which only a small percentage – less than 25 percent in many 
cases – are non-participants. Where selection bias could be more problematic is in 
the case of Southern European countries, where female labor market participation 
rates have traditionally been low. The fact that controlling for the Southern effect 
in Table 14, does not change the results of the paper we think is additional 
evidence against selection bias in our study.  Also, in Table 12 we compute the 
family gap and run regressions (shown in Table 13) using all women in the 
sample, participants or not, since we apply the coefficients from the earnings 
regressions to the average sample of human capital characteristics using all 
women in the sample, job market participants as well as non-participants. This 
                                                         
 
 
 
13
 To avoid congesting the paper with a large number of additional tables, these results are 
not presented here, but are of course available from the authors. 
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should help take care of selection bias, if the level of the human capital variables 
of participants is very different to the group of non-market participants. As can be 
seen in Table 12 (col-4) and in Table 13 (col-5), both the size of the family gap 
and the coefficients on the institutions variables remain almost unchanged. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have estimated the family gap in thirty five countries and 
have looked and the role of labor market institutions in explaining the cross-
country differences in this gap. Our approach has been based on the hypothesis 
that a distinguishing feature of mothers is their need to transition in and out of the 
labor market around childbirth and that labor market institutions affect both the 
probability and the length on such transitions. 
We have found that the wage penalty associated to motherhood varies 
significantly across countries. We found that mothers in Southern Europe suffer a 
wage penalty up to two times as large as mothers in Nordic countries.  
An important result of this study is that there is not much of a relation 
between the family and the gender gaps across countries. We found that often 
labor market institutions have opposite effects on these two sources of wage 
inequality and that hence the task of designing optimal policies to reduce both is 
not straightforward. In particular, our results indicate that protecting mothers 
against contract termination, either by use of parental leave or job protection 
regulations, would be the most effective way of reducing the earnings gap 
between mothers and non-mothers but also between men and women. Instead, 
policies traditionally associated to wage compression, although effective at 
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lowering the gender gap, might lead to an increase in the wage gap between 
mothers and women without children. Our interpretation of these results is that an 
important reason mothers lag behind other women in terms of earnings is the loss 
of accumulated job market experience due to job transitions around childbirth. 
Furthermore, to the extent many women are also mothers, this is also an important 
reason for the wage gap between women and men. 
Finally, we compared and ranked groups of countries according to the 
magnitude of the family and the gender gaps. We found that mothers in Southern 
European countries suffer the highest family gap, although the gender gap is 
relatively low there. An important research question is how much of the extremely 
low fertility rates in Southern European countries (Adserà 2004, Del Boca et al 
2003) can be explained by the high family gap. Also, the data we used in this 
study is cross-sectional and hence is not well suited to study in detail the 
frequency and length of job transitions that mothers go through around childbirth. 
Longitudinal datasets would be the natural alternative and we think that an 
important research topic is to look in more detail at the impact of labor market 
institutions on job transitions by mothers. 
Although labor market institutions are seldom exogenous events, the 
empirical approach we have used in this paper treats them as exogenous to the 
family gap. The endogeneity of labor market institutions to the family gap can be 
better understood in the context of the profound changes in employment patters 
within the family that occurred in most countries in recent decades. One of the 
most important manifestations of this pattern of change is the declining 
importance of the traditional male-breadwinner family, where the family relies 
almost exclusively on the male as the source of income. For example, in the U.S., 
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the percentage of dual-earner couples amongst all married-couples has increased 
from 44 per cent in 1967 to 59 per cent in 2001 (Drago, Black and Wooden 2004). 
One could view different countries in different stages in this transition process. 
Labor market institutions not only influence mothers‟ pay, but can also be the 
result of the stage of evolution a country has achieved in regards to the transition 
from the male-breadwinner model to the dual-earner model. In Spain, for 
example, the use of temporary contracts was made easier in the mid nineties as a 
response in part to the low participation rate of women and the high 
unemployment rate, which exceeded twenty per cent at that time. Labor market 
reform seemed the right response but helped create a dual labor market where 
mothers might have suffered the most. One interpretation of the results of this 
paper, put in perspective, would indicate that the labor market institutions that 
Spain put in place during the nineties could have contributed to make worse the 
same problem they were intended to eradicate. More in general, the results of this 
paper suggest that two types of institutions are most appropriate to help countries 
complete the transition from the male-breadwinner family to the dual-earner 
family: the group of „tenure enhancing‟ institutions that is common in Nordic 
countries and institutions that stimulate mothers‟ labor supply, quite frequent in 
liberal countries. 
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 Tables and Figures 
Table 1. List of countries and years. ISSP data. ‘Family and Changing Gender Roles’ study. 
Country 
Years Area Earnings Sample Size – all women* 
Australia 
1994, 2002 LIBERAL Annual gross wage and 
salary income (1994) 
Monthly net income 
(2002) 
790 
Austria 
1988, 1994 CONTINENTAL Monthly net income 
(1988) Monthly net 
earnings (1994) 
784 
Belgium 
2002 CONTINENTAL Net monthly income 709 
Brazil 
2002 OTHER Monthly earnings 1,016 
Bulgaria 
2002 EASTERN Monthly net income 623 
Chile 
2002 OTHER Monthly net income 843 
Cyprus 
2002 OTHER Annual income 506 
Czech Republic 
1994, 2002 EASTERN Monthly net income 818 
Denmark 
2002 NORDIC Annual gross income 752 
Finland 
2002 NORDIC Monthly income 745 
France 
2002 CONTINENTAL Monthly earnings 1,259 
Germany (East) 
1988 EASTERN Monthly net income 569 
Germany (West) 
1988, 2002 CONTINENTAL Monthly n et income 1,092 
Hungary 
1994, 2002 EASTERN Monthly gross earnings 
(1994) 
Monthly income (2002) 
815 
Ireland 
1994 LIBERAL Weekly net earnings 575 
Israel 
1994, 2002 OTHER Monthly earnings (1994) 
Monthly net income 
(2002) 
688 
Italy 
1988, 1994 SOUTHERN Monthly net income 529 
Japan 
1994, 2002 OTHER Annual gross earnings 659 
Latvia 
2002 EASTERN Monthly net income 576 
Mexico 
2002 OTHER Earnings 888 
Netherlands 
1988 CONTINENTAL Annual net earnings 984 
New Zealand 
1994, 2002 LIBERAL Annual gross income 593 
Norway 
1994, 2002 NORDIC Annual gross earnings 
(1994) 
Gross income (2002) 
960 
Philippines 
2002 OTHER Monthly income 600 
Poland 
1994, 2002 EASTERN Monthly net earnings 797 
Portugal 
2002 SOUTHERN Monthly net income 649 
Russia 
1994, 2002 EASTERN Monthly net earnings 1,187 
Slovak Republic 
2002 EASTERN Earnings 589 
Slovenia 
1994, 2002 EASTERN Monthly regular income 574 
Spain 
2002 SOUTHERN Monthly earnings 1,285 
Sweden 
1994, 2002 NORDIC Monthly gross earnings 
(1994) 
Monthly gross income 
(2002) 
628 
Switzerland 
2002 CONTINENTAL Monthly earnings 514 
Taiwan 
2002 OTHER Earnings 1,007 
United Kingdom 
1988, 1994, 2002 LIBERAL Annual gross earnings 1,098 
United States 
1988, 1994, 2002 LIBERAL Annual gross earnings 778 
* When a country appears more than one year in the data the number in the column is the average sample size across years.  
 
Page 39 of 52
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 40 
Table 2. List of countries and information on labor market institutions. 
Country 
Parental Leave Job Protection Temporary 
Contracts 
Trade Union 
Coverage 
Unemployment 
Benefits 
Minimum Wage 
Australia X X X X X X 
Austria X X X X X X 
Belgium X X X X X X 
Brazil     X  
Bulgaria     X  
Chile     X  
Cyprus       
Czech Republic X X X X X  
Denmark X X X X X  
Finland X X X X X  
France X X X X X X 
Germany (East)       
Germany (West) X X X X X  
Hungary X X X X X  
Ireland X X X X X  
Israel       
Italy X X X X X  
Japan X X X X X X 
Latvia       
Mexico X X X  X  
Netherlands X X X X X X 
New Zealand  X X X X X 
Norway X X X X X  
Philippines     X  
Poland X X X X X  
Portugal X X X X X X 
Russia     X  
Slovak Republic X X X X X  
Slovenia     X  
Spain X X X X X X 
Sweden X X X X X  
Switzerland X X X X X  
Taiwan     X  
United Kingdom X X X X X X 
United States X X X X X X 
TIME-VARYING NO YES YES YES NO YES 
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Table 3. Correlation coefficients. Labor market institutions. 
 LEAVE PROTECTREG RESTRICTEMP COVERAGE UBENEFITS 
LEAVE 1         
PROTECTREG 0.4627 1       
RESTRICTTEMP -0.1653 -0.3152 1     
COVERAGE 0.3545 0.4197 -0.409 1   
UBENEFITS 0.6727 0.3018 -0.0996 0.2837 1 
Notes: LEAVE indicates the duration of the parental leave period; PROTECTREG indicates the strictness of regulations governing the firing of workers with regular contracts. 
RESTRICTEMP indicates the strictness of restrictions on the use of temporary contracts by firms. COVERAGE indicates trade union coverage. UBENEFITS indicates the 
generosity of social benefits to the unemployed. 
 
Table 4. Average family and gender gaps, male wage compression.  
 FAMILYGAP GENDERGAP SD SDRES 
Southern Europe .3560 .2864 .3136 .4792 
Liberal .3196 .3971 .4370 .4727 
Continental .2432 .3091 .3548 .4664 
Nordic .2088 .2602 .3245 .4810 
Other .1065 .4175 .3792 .4866 
Eastern .1404 .3080 .3261 .4857 
Note: FAMILYGAP and GENDERGAP are respectively the predicted family gap and gender gap evaluated at U.S. values for 
mother and non-mother, men and women characteristics; SD is the standard deviation of predicted log wages applying each 
country‟s male wage equation to U.S. men; SDRES is the standard deviation of each country‟s male log wage residuals calculated 
from its male wage equation. 
 
Table 5. OLS Regression results – Male wage compression 
 Dependent Variable = FAMILYGAP Dependent Variable = GENDERGAP 
 Coeff. t-stat (SE) Coeff. t-stat (SE) Coeff. t-stat (SE) Coeff. t-stat (SE) 
SD 
.2986 1.14 
(.2622) 
.3242 1.21 
(.2683) 
.3427 1.80 
(.1901) 
.3696 1.91 
(.1939) 
SDRES 
  1.1529 .54 
(2.1321) 
  1.2104 .79 
(1.5408) 
Year 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 
54 54 54 54 
R2 
.12 .12 .15 .16 
Note – SD is the standard deviation of predicted log wages applying each country‟s male wage equation to US men. SDRES is the standard 
deviation of each country‟s male log wage residuals calculated from its male wage equations.  
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Table 6. Results for parental leave and job protection. OLS regressions. 
 FAMILY GAP GENDER GAP 
 Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) 
LVWEEKS -.0030 
-1.87 
(.0016) 
-.0025 
-1.37 
(.0018) 
    -.0017 
-.98 
(.0017) 
-.0027 
-1.65 
(.0016) 
-.0023 
-1.25 
(.0018) 
    
LVREP   -.0005 
-.64 
(.0008) 
        -.0004 
-.53 
(.0008) 
    
PROTREG     -.0578 
-2.27 
(.0255) 
-.0679 
-2.57 
(.0264) 
-.0558 
-1.85 
(.0301) 
    -.0165 
-.62 
(.0266) 
-.0068 
-.25 
(.0276) 
RESTRICTEMP       -.0173 
-1.32 
(.0131) 
-.0166 
-1.23 
(.0134) 
      .0166 
1.21 
(.0137) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 38 37 40 40 38 38 37 40 40 
R2 .15 .17 .17 .21 .25 .16 .17 .11 .14 
Note – LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. LVREP is the replacement rate during parental leave. - PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs. RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under 
temporary contracts (the higher the index the more difficult this is). 
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Table 7. Results for collective bargaining coverage. OLS regression. 
 FAMILY GAP GENDER GAP 
 Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) 
COVERAGE .0004 
.45 
(.0010) 
.0011 
.83 
(.0013) 
.0010 
1.01 
(.0010) 
.0016 
1.49 
(.0011) 
-.0030 
-3.67 
(.0008) 
-.0030 
 
-3.13 
(.0009) 
RANK   -.1137 
-.75 
(.1512) 
        
PROTREG     -.0838 
-2.83 
(.0296) 
-.0684 
-2.17 
(.0314) 
    
RESTRICTEMP     -.0291 
-1.82 
(.0160) 
-.0262 
-1.62 
(.0161) 
    
LVWEEKS       -.0028 
-1.55 
(.0018) 
  -.0009 
-.56 
(.0016) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 34 34 34 32 34 32 
R2 .05 .07 .29 .37 .34 .36 
Note – LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. LVREP is the replacement rate during parental leave. - PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs. RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts 
(the higher the index the more difficult this is).  COVERAGE is the percentage of employees affected directly or indirectly by trade union arrangements. RANK is the ranking of countries from the lowest level of trade union coverage to the highest. 
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Table 8. Results for unemployment benefits and the minimum wage. OLS regression. 
 FAMILY GAP GENDER GAP 
 Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) 
UBENEFITS .3933 
2.96 
(.1326) 
.4794 
2.67 
(.1795) 
.5898 
1.23 
(.4777) 
  -.0697 
-.64 
(.1086) 
.2508 
.91 
(.2748) 
.5512 
1.24 
(.4455) 
  
MINWAGE       -.0511 
-.14 
(.3537) 
      -.9942 
-2.67 
(.3725) 
LVWEEKS   -.0038 
-2.13 
(.0018) 
-.0045 
-1.99 
(.0022) 
      -.0024 
-1.20 
(.0020) 
  
PROTREG   -.0560 
-2.03 
(.0276) 
-.0633 
-2.01 
(.0314) 
          
RESTRICTEMP   -.0312 
-2.32 
(.0135) 
-.0258 
-1.61 
(.0160) 
          
COVERAGE     .0013 
1.20 
(.0011) 
    -.0034 
-3.71 
(.0009) 
-.0032 
-3.35 
(.0009) 
  
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 52 38 32 17 52 34 32 17 
R2 .25 .39 .41 .15 .09 .36 .40 .47 
Note – LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs. RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts (the higher the index the more difficult this is).  
UBENEFITS is an index indicating the generosity of unemployment benefits. MINWAGE is the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage. COVERAGE is the percentag  of employees affected directly or indirectly by trade union arrangements. 
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Table 9. Job interruptions, COVERAGE, UBENEFITS, Part-time employment. Correlation 
coefficients. ISSP data and Institutions data. 
 JOBINTERRUPT PART-TIME UBENEFITS COVERAGE URATE-FEMALE 
JOBINTERRUPT 1.0000     
PART-TIME .8016 1.0000    
UBENEFITS -.5832 -.2474 1.0000   
COVERAGE -.5025 -.3377 .5679 1.0000  
URATE-FEMALE -.4092 -.4789 .1391 .5949 1.0000 
 
Table 10. Price effect versus human capital effect. OLS regression. 
 PRICEFFECT HCEFFECT 
 Coeff t Coeff t 
UBENEFITS -3.7061 -1.02 3.7255 1.03 
COVERAGE -.0130 -1.33 .0154 1.58 
PROTREG .1032 .45 -.1756 -.77 
RESTRICTEMP -.0295 -.27 -.0031 -.03 
LVWEEKS .0246 1.50 -.0266 -1.63 
R
2
 .23 .29 
 
Table 11. Accounting for the difference in the family gap.    
 
Log points difference with the average of all countries due to: 
Region 
Family 
Gap 
Parental 
Leave 
Job 
Protection 
Temporary 
Contracts 
Trade 
Union 
Coverage 
Unemployment 
Benefits 
Tenure 
Enhancing 
Wage 
Compressing 
TOTAL 
DIFFERENCE 
SOUTHERN .360 .002 -.035 .075 .025 -.002 .042 .023 .066 
LIBERAL .349 .066 .080 -.042 -.023 -.027 .104 -.050 .055 
CONTINENTAL .302 .027 -.024 .007 .023 -.025 .010 -.002 .008 
OTHER .278 .033 -.021 .010 -.060 .022 .022 -.038 -.016 
NORDIC .247 -.126 -.017 .008 .025 .062 -.135 .087 -.048 
EASTERN .183 -.015 -.041 -.022 -.035 .001 -.078 -.034 -.111 
Note: FAMILY GAP are the fitted values using the coefficients of a regression of the family gap against parental leave, job protection regulation, 
restrictions on the use of temporary contracts, trade union coverage, unemployment benefits and year dummies, but omitting the effect of year dummies. 
TOTAL DIFFERENCE is the log-points difference in the family gap between a specific group of countries and the average of all countries in our sample. 
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Table 12. Family Gap in Pay. Different Specifications. 
 
(1) 
FAMILYGAP 
(2) 
FAMILYGAP2 
(3) 
FAMILYGAP3 
(4) 
FAMILYGAP4 
(5) 
FAMILYGAP5 
Southern .356 .415 .269 .360 .359 
Liberal .319 .319 .190 .332 .301 
Continental .243 .268 .155 .242 .212 
Nordic .208 .210 .120 .215 .221 
Eastern .140 .103 -.010 .141 .153 
Other .106 .246 .069 .099 .106 
Difference in 
characteristics 
between mothers 
and non-mothers 
YES YES NO YES YES 
All mothers – 
participants and 
non-participants - 
are used to 
compute average 
level of 
observable 
characteristics 
NO NO NO YES NO 
Control for lone 
mother (marital 
status-partner) 
NO NO NO NO YES 
JOBINTERRUPT NO YES YES NO NO 
INPUBLIC NO YES YES NO NO 
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Table 13. Results for various specifications. OLS regression. 
 
(1) 
FAMILYGAP 
(2) 
FAMILYGAP2 
(3) 
FAMILYGAP3 
(4) 
FAMILYGAP3 
(5) 
FAMILYGAP 
(6) 
FAMILYGAP 
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
UBENEFITS .5898 1.23 .8075 1.56 .3942 .63   .3843 .84 .9955 1.71 
COVERAGE .0013 1.20 .0014 1.17 .0015 1.01   .0012 1.11 .0007 .50 
PROTREG -.0633 -2.01 -.0620 -1.82 -.0545 -1.34   -.0775 -2.57 -.0694 -1.81 
RESTRICTEMP -.0258 -1.61 -.0442 -2.54 -.0385 -1.85 -.0181 -1.03 -.0250 -1.57 -.0316 -1.62 
LVWEEKS -.0045 -1.99 -.0058 -2.36 -.0033 -1.12 -.0054 -2.47 -.0040 -1.78 -.0054 -1.96 
SOCIALSEC       .9778 2.54     
COLLREL       .0287 .13     
EMPLAW       -.1051 -.58     
R2 .40 .49 .35 .32 .38 .39 
Difference in characteristics 
between mothers and non-
mothers 
YES YES NO YES YES YES 
All mothers – participants and 
non-participants - are used to 
compute average level of 
observable characteristics 
NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Control for lone mother 
(marital status-partner) 
NO NO NO NO NO YES 
JOBINTERRUPT NO YES  YES NO NO NO 
INPUBLIC NO YES YES NO NO NO 
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Table 14. Results for the Southern effect. OLS regressions. 
 FAMILYGAP 
 Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) 
LVWEEKS   -.0014 
-.83 
(.0017) 
-.0014 
-.82 
(.0017) 
-.0042 
-1.85 
(.0023) 
PROTREG -.0700 
-2.84 
(.0246) 
-.0605 
-2.12 
(.0285) 
-.0612 
-2.08 
(.0294) 
-.0653 
-2.06 
(.0316) 
RESTRICTEMP     -.0026 
-.17 
(.0153) 
-.0151 
-.76 
(.0200) 
COVERAGE       .0013 
1.14 
(.0011) 
UBENEFITS       .6042 
1.26 
(.4801) 
SOUTHERN .1707 
2.32 
(.0736) 
.1643 
2.18 
(.0755) 
.1562 
1.73 
(.0901) 
.0874 
.89 
(.0984) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 40 38 38 32 
R2 .28 .31 .32 .42 
Note – LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs. RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is 
for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts (the higher the index the more difficult this is).  COVERAGE is the percentage of employees affected directly or indirectly 
by trade union arrangements. UBENEFITS is an index measuring the generosity of social benefits to the unemployed. SOUTHERN is a dummy variable with value 1 for 
Portugal, Spain and Italy. 
 
Figure 1. Family gap. Fitted values versus raw data. ISSP data. 
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Data Appendix 
 TENURE ENHANCING POLICIES WAGE COMPRESSING POLICIES 
 
LVWEEKS 
(weeks)1 
LVREP 
(%)1 
PROTREG 
(index)2 
RESTRICTEMP 
(index)3 
COVERAGE 
(%)4 
UBENEFITS 
(index)5 
MINWAGE 
(%)6 
 1999-01 
1999-
01 
80s 90s 00s 80s 90s 00s 80s 90s 00s 90s 1986 2000 
SOUTHERN 20.6 93.3 3.5 2.9 2.9 0.9 1.6 2.0 70.0 73.3 80.0 0.80 0.53 0.35 
CONTINENTAL 15.5 95.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.6 77.5 79.1 77.1 0.75 0.58 0.52 
LIBERAL 8.0 28.5 0.9 1.1 1.2 3.5 3.5 3.3 59.0 49.5 37.25 0.71 0.48 0.47 
NORDIC 47.0 83.2 2.3 2.2 2.2 1.8 2.6 2.6 77.5 77.5 82.5 0.89 0.59 NA 
EASTERN 24.5 89.7 NA 2.7 2.7 NA 1.5 1.4 NA NA 36.2 0.81 NA 0.40 
OTHER 13.0 80.0 2.4 2.3 2.3 0.28 0.31 0.37 25.0 20.0 15.0 0.51 0.29 0.33 
Notes: 
SOUTHERN countries are Portugal, Italy and Spain. CONTINENTAL countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, W. Germany and Switzerland. LIBERAL countries are Australia, Ireland, New 
Zealand, U.K. and U.S. NORDIC countries are Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. EASTERN countries are the Czech Republic, E. Germany, Latvia, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia 
and Slovenia. OTHER countries are Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Philippines and Taiwan.   
1
LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. LVREP is the replacement rate during parental leave. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2001). Data is for the 1999-2001 period. 
2
PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs; the higher the index, the stricter the protection against the dismissal of workers in regular jobs. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004).  
3
RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts. It indicates the number of valid cases for temporary contracts other than the usual objective reasons; the higher 
the index the more difficult is for firms to use temporary contracts. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004).  
4
COVERAGE is the percentage of employees affected directly or indirectly by trade union arrangements. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004). 
5
UBENEFITS is a one-time index of the generosity of unemployment benefits, combining information on the replacement rate and the duration of unemployment benefits. The higher the index the more generous 
unemployment benefits are. Source: Botero et al., (2004). 
6MINWAGE is the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage in each country. Source: O.E.C.D. Minimum Wage Database. 
 
 LVWEEKS 
(weeks) 
LVREP 
(%) 
PROTREG 
(index) 
RESTRICTEMP 
(index) 
COVERGAE 
(%) 
UBENEFITS 
(index) 
MINWAGE 
(%) 
 1999-01 1999-01 80S 90S 00S 80s 90s 00s 80s 90s 00s 90s 1986 2000 
Australia 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.50 1.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 80.00 80.00 80.00 0.79 0.63 0.58 
Austria 16.00 100.00 2.90 2.90 2.40 2.75 2.75 2.75 95.00 95.00 95.00 0.63   
Brasil            0.56   
Bulgaria            0.84   
Chile            0.73   
Cyprus               
Czech 28.00 69.00  3.30 3.30  3.25 3.25   25.00 0.74  0.31 
Denmark 30.00 100.00 1.50 1.50 1.50 2.25 3.25 3.25 70.00 70.00 80.00 0.90 0.62  
Finland 52.00 70.00 2.80 2.30 2.20 2.50 2.50 2.50 90.00 90.00 90.00 0.91   
Flanders 15.00 77.00 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.00 2.25 2.25 90.00 90.00 90.00 0.86 0.57 0.49 
France 16.00 100.00 2.30 2.30 2.50 1.75 1.50 1.50 80.00 90.00 90.00 0.82 0.63 0.62 
GermanyE               
GermanyW 14.00 100.00 2.60 2.70 2.70 2.00 2.75 2.75 80.00 80.00 68.00 0.78 0.59  
Hungary 24.00 100.00 . 1.90 1.90  3.25 3.25   30.00 0.78  0.50 
Ireland 14.00 70.00 1.60 1.60 1.60 3.50 3.50 3.25    0.76  0.56 
Israel            0.85   
Italy 21.50 80.00 1.80 1.80 1.80 0.25 1.00 2.50 80.00 80.00 80.00 0.73 0.75  
Japan 14.00 60.00 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.00 2.25 2.75 25.00 20.00 15.00 0.82 0.29 0.33 
Latvia            0.80   
Mexico 12.00 100.00  2.30 2.30 0.25 0.25 0.25    0.00   
Netherlands 16.00 100.00 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.00 3.25 3.25 70.00 70.00 80.00 0.68 0.56 0.47 
NewZEaland    1.40 1.70 3.50 3.50 3.00 60.00 60.00 25.00 0.56 0.47 0.46 
Norway 42.00 100.00 2.30 2.30 2.30 1.25 1.50 1.50 70.00 70.00 70.00 0.82   
Philippines            0.00   
Poland 18.00 100.00  2.20 2.20  3.50 2.50   40.00 0.83  0.38 
Portugal 24.30 100.00 4.80 4.30 4.30 1.50 2.00 2.00 70.00 70.00 80.00 0.85 0.47 0.38 
Russia            0.90   
Slovak 28.00 90.00  3.60 3.50  3.25 3.50   50.00 0.79  0.41 
Slovenia            0.86   
Spain 16.00 100.00 3.90 2.60 2.60 1.00 2.00 1.75 60.00 70.00 80.00 0.81 0.37 0.32 
Sweden 64.00 63.00 2.90 2.90 2.90 1.00 3.25 3.25 80.00 80.00 90.00 0.94 0.57  
Swiss 16.00  1.20 1.20 1.20 3.50 3.50 3.50 50.00 50.00 40.00 0.74   
Taiwan            0.67   
Uk 18.00 44.00 0.90 0.90 1.10 3.50 3.50 3.50 70.00 40.00 30.00 0.78 0.46 0.42 
US 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 3.50 3.50 3.50 26.00 18.00 14.00 0.66 0.37 0.36 
Notes: 
SOUTHERN countries are Portugal, Italy and Spain. CONTINENTAL countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, W. Germany and Switzerland. LIBERAL countries 
are Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, U.K. and U.S. NORDIC countries are Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. EASTERN countries are the Czech Republic, E. Germany, 
Latvia, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia and Slovenia. OTHER countries are Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Philippines and Taiwan.   
1LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. LVREP is the replacement rate during parental leave. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2001). Data is for the 
1999-2001 period. 
2PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs; the higher the index, the stricter the protection against the dismissal of workers in regular jobs. Source: 
O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004).  
3RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts. It indicates the number of valid cases for temporary contracts other than the 
usual objective reasons; the higher the index the more difficult is for firms to use temporary contracts. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004).  
4COVERAGE is the percentage of employees affected directly or indirectly by trade union arrangements. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004). 
5UBENEFITS is a one-time index of the generosity of unemployment benefits, combining information on the replacement rate and the duration of unemployment benefits. The 
higher the index the more generous unemployment benefits are. Source: Botero et al., (2004). 
6MINWAGE is the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage in each country. Source: O.E.C.D. Minimum Wage Database. 
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